Across Europe’s capitals, a palpable dread has emerged at the prospect of former President Donald Trump’s reelection. From Oslo to Budapest, Zurich to Prague, leaders and diplomats now voice concerns, if not panic, at the specter of another Trump presidency. “Will his foreign policy be authoritarian?” a Norwegian broadcaster recently asked me. Such anxiety has morphed into a near-obsession with the U.S. election, with the term “existential” often invoked to describe its stakes.
The irony of Europe’s ostensible paranoia is rich. The continent does indeed face existential threats, from the war in Ukraine to migrant flows from the African Sahel, an increasingly assertive China, Houthi attacks on European vessels, and a growing risk of domestic terrorism, to name but a few. Trump is the least of Europe’s concerns. In fact, he might be the reverse.
Such European unease also underscores the persistent reluctance of its leaders to assume responsibility for the region’s security despite its acknowledged military impotence.
Yet regardless of who takes office in January, Europe’s weakness and the challenges it faces will persist. Rather than fixate on an election beyond their control, European leaders would do well to focus on bolstering their defenses and crafting strategies to mitigate the growing geopolitical risks — or at the very least, avoid courting them. This, rather than whether Trump wins or loses, will arguably be more critical for Europe’s security and the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance.
Whether Europe is up to the task remains an open question. Despite some promising spending increases, those promises have yet to translate into larger troop sizes or enhanced military capabilities. And as the war in Ukraine has again shown, in war, both matter.
Seventy percent of European NATO nations now allocate at least 2% of their gross domestic product to defense. Yet the U.K. plans to reduce its troop levels to 72,500 by 2025, marking the smallest British Army since the Napoleonic Wars. Two years into its Zeitenwende on defense, Germany is 20,000 soldiers short of what it needs to fulfill its current military mandate. Italy and France, the latter boasting Europe’s largest armed force, face similar shortfalls.
Europe also faces deficiencies in satellite-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It lacks adequate missile defense systems, aircraft for transporting heavy equipment, and is limited in its air-to-air refueling abilities. Shortages of artillery shells persist, as does the curious trend of exporting what little is produced, despite demand within Europe.
And though France and Britain possess nuclear capabilities, their arsenals number in the hundreds. Russia has a nuclear arsenal of about 4,380 warheads. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities — faster than any other nation. It could boast 1,500 warheads by 2035.
For Europe, building the military capabilities needed to contend with its increasingly challenging security environment will require time, money, and willpower. All seem to be in short supply. While Europe’s political class appears aware of the looming threats, there remains in certain circles a peculiar denial about their gravity. It might, so the thinking goes, not all be so dire. Such naive thinking might explain Europe’s continued courtship of Beijing and its persistent economic ties with Russia, with much Euro-Russian trade now routed via central Asia.
In other circles, geopolitical threats and their ostensible solutions are treated as academic exercises. French President Emanuel Macron, for instance, has long championed the formation of a European military as part of his vision for Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” the details of which remain largely undefined. Never mind the region’s lack of military capabilities or that already in place are concrete NATO regional defense plans with corresponding commitments, which were accepted at Vilnius, Lithuania, last year. Rather than indulge fanciful notions, the focus should be on fulfilling these pledges. Judging by France’s first-round election results, most French seem to think so, too.
Nevertheless, the fixation remains with Trump. Can his moods be predicted? Who are his confidants? What of their moods? Are they isolationists? This is not serious. The trans-Atlantic alliance is not between individual people or political parties but nations. Regardless of who occupies the White House, it is a crucial national security partnership that should be treated as such.
Surely, too, European leaders must recall that under Trump, U.S. contributions to the European Deterrence Initiative grew from $1.7 billion in 2017 to $6.5 billion in 2019. U.S. Marines participated in the Finnish Arrow Exercise for the first time ever. NATO exercises continued uninterrupted, and U.S. pressure helped to boost the alliance.
Europe, too, must finally awaken to the profound and substantial existential threats it and the wider free world actually face, of which Trump is not one. Addressing these challenges will require a robust collective effort. Europe, then, must rise to the occasion. Should it fall short, alliances could indeed be reviewed and revised — a consequence for which Europe, not America, would be responsible. The sooner we can help our European friends to understand this, the better for us all.