The uncomfortable question that the TikTok ban raises is: how much of what we see online is shaped by foreign influence, and what are the consequences of that limitation of speech for free expression and in shaping our democracy?
Social media platforms have become key battlegrounds for influence, shaping public opinion, and even impacting political landscapes. While we all have the responsibility of educating ourselves and staying informed about prevalent information, where do we draw the line when a foreign government is providing that information and influence? With more than 170 million users in the U.S., TikTok has come under scrutiny for allegedly promoting content that aligns with the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
TikTok is owned by the Chinese company ByteDance. The loudest proponents of the ban cite China’s regular practice of censorship and control over content that is accessible to its own citizens. ByteDance operates the application using a closed algorithm that determines what content appears on a user’s feed. The details of this practice are not publicly disclosed, raising major questions about biases and intentional content manipulation. The practice of speech and content control is not new to China; to call a ban on an application a restriction of free speech, when the application itself directly restricts free speech, is short-sighted.
This practice has been evident throughout the app’s moderation of videos sensitive to China, such as those related to the Hong Kong protests, COVID restrictions and abuse, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, or content on the treatment of the Uyghur Muslim community to name a few. This regulation is not new to China or its business practices. Jerome Hudson reports in his book “50 Things They Don’t Want You to Know” that in 2018 Google, a U.S.-owned company, worked on a project in China codenamed “Dragonfly”—a “censored Chinese search engine with direct government oversight.” The research revealed that this tool was not only used for “censorship of searches that were unfavorable to the Chinese Communist Party, such as searches on democracy, religion, and criticism of communism or CCP leaders,” but that the tool was used as a surveillance measure against its own citizens. To think that China would not do the same to U.S. citizens—when it openly does so to its own—shows a lack of understanding of the CCP’s methodology of control. This practice, committed by a foreign adversary, exploits the platform’s nearly 170 million U.S. users and raises major concerns about what information China is promoting to U.S. citizens. This could result in, to name a few outcomes, prospective election interference or the creation of a CCP-sympathetic citizenry.
The proposed workaround for TikTok for many U.S.-based users? RedNote. I.e. Xiaohongshu (Little Red Book). I.e., Mao’s little red book. An application named after the ramblings of a communist dictator? Probably not the route I would take in a quest of defiance in the name of free speech.
Espionage Risks Through Data Harvesting and Hacking
Much of the debate over TikTok centers on concerns about data privacy and the platform’s potential misuse of personal information. Given its ownership by the Chinese company ByteDance, there are significant questions about how user data is collected, stored, and protected.
Due to Chinese business regulations, content can be easily acquired through both direct control and legal pressures. Wiley, an independent law firm, wrote a report regarding how U.S. businesses navigate data access by the Chinese government: “The Counter Espionage Law, National Intelligence Law, and Cybersecurity Law also grant PRC security and intelligence officials the right to enter otherwise restricted business facilities, inspect company records, acquire sensitive data, investigate and question personnel, and seize communications equipment and other property. Under the Cybersecurity Law and Encryption Law, moreover, businesses may be subjected to invasive security audits, requiring the disclosure of source code and other sensitive intellectual property.”
Through its algorithm and access to user devices, TikTok collects large swaths of personal information from its users, including, but not limited to, location data, device information, and browsing history. If an adversary wants an employee to provide a backdoor into Cyber systems that can impact U.S. infrastructure in a major way, would it take long to find a mid-20s engineer a foreign adversary could blackmail with their browsing data? In a BuzzFeed report, it was exposed that ByteDance employees repeatedly access the nonpublic information of TikTok users on behalf of the CCP, despite sworn testimony from TikTok executives during a 2021 Senate hearing that only “a world-renowned, U.S.-based security team decides who gets access to this data.” The real story? This “U.S. staff” did not have permission or knowledge of how to access the data on their own.
One of the major concerns is how this data is stored, processed, and protected. While TikTok claims that all U.S.-based data is stored in the U.S., its lack of independent audits, transparency on data access practices, and the operational impact of its algorithms remain major concerns. Cybersecurity hacks from foreign adversaries have increased at an alarming rate over the last decade. Data mining—the practice of tracing patterns and relationships in data—only exacerbates opportunities for data misuse and hacking. Hackers gradually infiltrate larger systems that do not employ adequate zero trust safeguards or provide their employees with proper training on how to safeguard systems. A minor click-through quarterly cyber training is not enough defense against a foreign adversary.
It is well known in the intelligence community that espionage attempts from China outweigh that of any other foreign adversary. The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) found that China is vastly ramping up its espionage tactics against the United States. Of the known espionage attempts, 69% account for after Xi Jinping became President in March 2013 and announced reinvigorated efforts to increase China’s “collection efforts.” Hacking is China’s preferred tool of espionage. CSIS’s study found that over 46% of these incidents were cyber in nature. While espionage attempts are difficult to quantify due to the amount of time it takes an entity to know a hacker is in their system and evidenced under-reporting, they are believed to have cost U.S. taxpayers and industry billions of dollars. Concerns about geospatial, or location tracking, have also been cited in the 2019 ban of TikTok from U.S. military-owned devices, along with a recommendation to delete the app from military personnel’s personal phones.
A major counterargument is that U.S. companies engage in similar data aggregation and misuse. Indeed, there are major issues surrounding data privacy and misuse that should, and can, be addressed in our free and democratic society, where checks and balances, and the voice of citizenry, play a role in government and businesses. However, entities that are owned by, or have oversight from, foreign adversaries do not play by the same set of rules and are of primary concern to our national security interests.
Geopolitical Tensions Through Influence on Children and Psychological Warfare
While obvious national security concerns exist, there is a deeper psychological operation that cannot be ignored. Why worry about battling an adversary when you can make them less intelligent and less likely to think freely? China is playing the long game as evidenced by its completely separate algorithm for its users than that of its U.S. base.
The United States is not the first country to ban the application; China itself banned TikTok and pushed users toward the Chinese version, Duoyin. This algorithm rewards users for promoting content that directly benefits China such as professional content focused on STEM, news media, and culture. The U.S.-based algorithm, on the other hand, promotes creator-driven content focused on TikTok challenges and trends—many of which reveal personal information and have a history of encouraging dangerous and revealing challenges. Not only could this content be used to access and exploit personal information in an adversarial way, but the differences in the algorithms show a disturbing correlation that is not easy to overlook.
In China, users are rewarded for producing smart and cohesive content. In America, the more trivial or sensational the posts, the higher the views.
An arguably more disturbing avenue to explore is the impact on ⅓ of TikTok’s user base, minors. Major concerns have been raised within the psychology community and among parents regarding the app’s impact on minors’ privacy, mental health, and overall safety. In China’s version of TikTok, users under 14 are required to use the app in moderation, with a daily limit of 40 minutes. Do we think the same level of concerned moderation applies to U.S. minors? The answer is no.
TikTok is a tool for the CCP, and a utility tool at that. A distracted populace, one not focused on issues that impact our sovereignty and security, ultimately serves as fuel for risk for the next generation of America’s children.
Bottom Line
The TikTok ban is just one example, of many to come, in the intersection of national security, foreign influence, and the protection of free speech in the digital age. Social media platforms undeniably play a significant role in shaping public opinion and cultural discourse, as many forms of media have in years’ past; the risks posed by foreign ownership—especially when involving an adversarial government like China—demands scrutiny from both our government and its citizens.
These concerns over data privacy, censorship, and the potential for espionage highlight the vulnerabilities that will, if left unmeasured, undermine both individual freedoms and national sovereignty—the very concerns that those frustrated by the ban, promote. When navigating these challenges, it is crucial to balance the need for security with the principles of free expression, ensuring that available technology serves the interests of our democratic values and national sovereignty, rather than jeopardizing them.